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COVID-19 AND US TAX POLICY:
WHAT NEEDS TO CHANGE?
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Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
The University of Michigan
1. Introduction

re

The COVID-19 Pandemic already feels like a historical turning point akin to Word Wars I
and II and the Great Depression. It may signal the end of the second period of
globalization (1980-2020) and a change in the relative positions of the US and China. It
could also lead in the US to significant changes in tax policy designed to bolster the
social safety net which was revealed as very porous during the pandemic.
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In what follows I will first discuss some short-term effects of the pandemic and then
some potential longer-term effects on US tax policy.
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2. Short-Term Changes

ep
rin
tn

ot

The CARES act, which passed unanimously through Congress in March, enacted some
significant modifications in tax policy. In particular, the CARES act relaxed limits on the
use of net operating losses by individuals and corporations, permitting 2020 losses to
offset 2015 to 2019 profits.1 It also relaxed the limits on interest deductibility.2 It
remains to be seen whether these changes will become permanent. During the last time
the US underwent a pandemic, the “Spanish flu” of 1918-19, it enacted major changes
to the corporate tax (the first tax-free reorganization provision, percentage depletion,
and the foreign tax credit) that are still with us over a century later.
In my opinion, another change is needed, which might be considered in 2021 if the
Democrats win in November. That change is to enact an excess profits tax on
corporations that benefit from the pandemic.
At a time when most American citizens and businesses suffer catastrophic economic
damage from the Coronavirus Recession, some corporations such as Amazon, 3M,
Gilead, and Zoom see their profits rise dramatically because of the pandemic.

1

Pr

The extension of the carryback period beyond 2018 means that these losses can be deducted against a 35% rate
(instead of 21%) as well as eliminate the one-time repatriation tax of 2017 (which was the price the multinationals
were supposed to pay for future tax-free repatriations). This is having your cake and eating it too with a
vengeance. Corporations even get to elect whether to apply the losses against the repatriation tax or the regular
tax, whichever is higher.
2
Allowing a deduction for interest and at the same time an exemption for offshore profits is a classic tax arbitrage
that implies negative tax rates on amounts not subject to GILTI.
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Given that most corporations are losing money but some are now earning excess profits
due to the crisis, it is time to revive the wartime excess profits taxes that the US
deployed in WW1 and WW2 to prevent the winners from achieving this form of
opportunistic unjust enrichment.

vie

The most recent US excess profits tax was enacted even before the US entered WW2. It
was first adopted in 1940, amended in 1941, 1942, 1943, and 1945, and repealed in
1950.3
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Excess profits taxes are designed to tax the proportion of profits that derives from some
external event not of the taxpayer’s making. The US excess profits tax was adopted by
Congress to “syphon off war profits.” It was intended both to address direct profits as
well as indirect profits resulting from the war, and the tax rate was set at 95%. This
made the definition of normal profits crucial, since those profits would only be taxed at
the regular corporate rate (currently 21%). Any profit above normal profit was deemed
to be excess profits.
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The calculation of the excess profits tax base began not with gross income but with net
income as shown on the corporate tax return. This number was then reduced to create
“excess profits tax net income.” The reduction removed certain items like long-term
capital gains and losses, income from discharge of indebtedness, and income from
recovering bad debts incurred before the war.
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“Excess profits tax net income” was then used to calculate the “excess profits tax
credit,” which was designed to remove normal profits from the tax base. There were
two methods used to calculate the credit: The “average earnings” method and the
“invested capital” method.
The average earnings method of calculating the excess profits tax credit began by
looking back at the years 1936, 1937, 1938, and 1939 (prior to the war) and determining
a monthly base-period average income. The amount of the credit was 95 percent of the
“average base period net income,” plus 8 percent of the corporation’s net capital
addition (or minus 6 percent of net capital reduction). The result created a deduction
from excess profits tax net income. The average base period net income was deemed to
be normal peacetime profit and therefore not subject to the excess profits tax.
Alternatively, the invested capital method assumed that a fair return on invested capital
is 8 percent on the first $5 million, 6 percent on the next $5 million, and 5 percent on

3
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The description of the excess profits tax is based on Nuccio, Timothy, Substance over Form: Creditability of the
1997 U.K. Windfall Tax as an Excess Profits Tax Under I.R.C. § 901 (July 1, 2012). Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems, 2013.
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invested capital beyond $10 million. Calculating invested capital involved summing all of
the cash and property invested in the corporation and all profits prior to the taxable
year, then reducing that figure by “all the distributions that have been made to
stockholders out of other than earnings and profits,” plus 50 percent of current debt.
This figure was then multiplied by a ratio of “inadmissible assets” to total current assets,
which removes credit allowance for partially or completely tax-exempt assets (such as
tax-exempt bonds and stock in corporations producing exempt dividends). The idea was
that a “taxpayer should be entitled to a reasonable allowance on its invested capital
before being subjected to the excess profits tax.”

re

Finally, the sum of the excess profits tax credit, any carry-back or carry-forward of
unused credits, and a de minimis exemption was deducted from excess profits tax net
income. The result was “adjusted excess profits tax net income,” which was taxed at
95%.

er

If Congress wanted to impose a modern excess profits tax, how should it go about it?
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Given the diversity of the corporations that are likely to profit from the pandemic and
the fact that most of them are not engaged in capital intensive activities, the tax should
use the average earnings method based on 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019.The rest of the
WW2 methodology can be applied unchanged. Thus, one would for example start with
the net income of Amazon for 2020, subtract a credit for average 2016-2019 earnings
plus 8% of R&D (the main capital investment), and apply a 95% tax rate to the excess
profits. The resulting tax can be reduced by credits for wages of additional employees
hired in 2020 to encourage the winners to hire and pay well during the recession.
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It is unconscionable that some corporations would profit from the current crisis while
everyone else suffers. Moreover, the federal government will be spending trillions to
save the economy, and much of this spending would benefit the winners since it will be
spent on their services. There is no reason not to use this opportunity to revive the
excess profit tax and apply it to profits that derive entirely from the pandemic.

3. Longer-Term Changes

In the longer term, significant changes to US tax policy are needed. In particular, the
corporate tax needs to be significantly strengthened and made more progressive.

Pr

The basic problem is that the current US corporate tax is inadequate to deal with the
increasing monopolization of the US economy, led by Big Tech (Facebook, Amazon,
Apple, Netflix, and Google). Big Tech have clearly become for early 21st century America
what Standard Oil, U.S. Steel, and the railroads were to early 20th century America: The
embodiment of corporate power that enjoys a near monopoly on an important segment
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of economic activity.4 Indeed, incumbent platforms (i.e., Big Tech) can potentially abuse
their monopolistic power in such manner that hinders the competitive process, stifles
innovation, and harms consumer welfare.5
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The corporate tax can limit corporate power in three ways. First, even a low rate
corporate tax requires corporations to provide the government with detailed
information about their activities that is hard to obtain without a corporate tax (e.g., it
forces them to calculate profits per taxing jurisdiction, which they may not otherwise
do). Second, potentially the corporate tax, like any tax, involves the power to destroy if
the rate is high enough. The knowledge that this could happen may limit the
aggressiveness of corporate management (i.e., in the case of the Big Techs, their
founders). Third and most important, the corporate tax can be used as a regulatory
device, with the effective rate being raised or lowered either for specific desirable or
undesirable activities (e.g., maintaining or compromising privacy) or in response to an
overall corporate social responsibility score.
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I have previously argued that such regulatory uses are the only valid reason to have a
corporate tax, since taxing shareholders is more easily accomplished by either taxing
them directly (in the case of closely held corporations) or taxing them on the changes in
the value of their shares (in the case of publicly traded corporations like the Big Techs).6
We believe that corporate taxation may be a useful complement to antitrust
enforcement in curbing the power of the Big Techs. Especially, corporate tax has a
probability of making anti-competitive killer acquisitions less lucrative. It can also be
used as a proper vehicle for regulating excessive monopolistic pricing, and might also
reduce unwanted consumer data accumulation by large platforms.
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Imagine a corporate tax, like the original corporate tax of 1909, that (a) does not include
a dividend received deduction, (b) does not include tax-free mergers, and (c) does not
permit consolidated returns. Such a tax would significantly limit the monopoly power of
the Big Techs by not enabling them to acquire competitors or potential competitors
(e.g., WhatsApp and Instagram for Facebook, Waze for Google) on a tax-free basis and
limiting their ability to use the profits of those corporations to fund R&D at the parent
level. Hence, corporate tax turns anti-competitive killer acquisitions to less lucrative.
However, such changes in the corporate tax may be too limited, too late, and would
unnecessarily harm corporations with no monopolization potential (the same argument
that was made against enacting a corporate tax to address the monopolization issue in

4
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See e.g., Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The Problem of Bigness: From Standard Oil to Google, Journal of Economic
Perspectives 33.3 (2019): 94-117.
5
See generally, Kenneth A. Bamberger and Orly Lobel, Platform market power, Berkeley Tech. LJ 32 (2017): 1051.
6
See generally Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1193
(2004).
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1909). This may be why the FDR administration, which believed in the regulatory power
of the corporate tax, did not undo the 1920s changes in the 1930s.7
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However, there may be another way of using the corporate tax to address the problem
of abusing monopoly power and exploiting consumers. The current corporate tax is flat:
“The amount of the tax imposed by subsection (a) shall be 21 percent of taxable
income.”8 Before 2017, there was some progressivity in the corporate tax, but it only
applied to small corporations (most of whom were not subject to the tax): A flat rate of
35% applied from taxable income of corporations over $10 million, and a surtax
eliminated the progressive rate structure for taxable income above $15 million.9

er

re

The rationale for the flat corporate tax was that corporations do not bear the burden of
the tax, people do, and therefore it was an inappropriate vehicle for redistribution
because the incidence of the tax was not clear (it could fall on shareholders, on all
capital providers, on employees or on consumers, depending on the economic model
used).10

7
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But if the corporate tax is conceived as primarily an antitrust device, then a sharply
progressive corporate tax makes sense. The purpose of monopolization is to increase
corporate profits. The more monopolistic a corporation is, the higher its profits are likely
to be, and the purpose of anti-competitive mergers is to eliminate competitors that
would decrease profits. Therefore, a highly progressive corporate tax (e.g., with top
rates of 70% or 80% above a high threshold of e.g., $10 billion in annual profit) would
tend to apply at the top only to monopolies. The more competition there is in an
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Steven A. Bank and Ajay K. Mehrotra, Corporate Taxation and the Regulation of Early Twentieth-Century
American Business (2015).
8
IRC section 11(b).
9
IRC section 11(b), 2017: The amount of the tax imposed by subsection (a) shall be the sum of-(A) 15 percent of so much of the taxable income as does not exceed $50,000,
(B) 25 percent of so much of the taxable income as exceeds $50,000 but does not exceed $75,000,
(C) 34 percent of so much of the taxable income as exceeds $75,000 but does not exceed $10,000,000, and
(D) 35 percent of so much of the taxable income as exceeds $10,000,000.
In the case of a corporation which has taxable income in excess of $100,000 for any taxable year, the amount of
tax determined under the preceding sentence for such taxable year shall be increased by the lesser of (i) 5 percent
of such excess, or (ii) $11,750. In the case of a corporation which has taxable income in excess of $15,000,000, the
amount of the tax determined under the foregoing provisions of this paragraph shall be increased by an additional
amount equal to the lesser of (i) 3 percent of such excess, or (ii) $100,000.
10
For a recent discussion of the incidence issue and an argument that the corporate tax falls mostly on economic
rents and is therefore born by capital see Edward Fox, "Does Capital Bear the U.S. Corporate Tax After All? New
Evidence from Corporate Tax Returns." J. Empirical Legal Stud. 17, no. 1 (2020): 71-115; see also Power, Laura, and
Austin Frerick. 2016. “Have Excess Returns to Corporations Been Increasing Over Time?” National Tax Journal 69
(4): 831–46. Given today's environment (expensing for equipment, some interest deductibility), this is probably
even more the case under current law.
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industry, the lower the likelihood of very high profits because the competition drives
down profits. In 2018, all of the Big Tech had profits above $10 billion.11

vie

In general, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google and Netflix all have high profit margins,
especially if we disallow expensing R&D, which tends to reduce their taxable income and
should not be expensed because it generates future profits, and tax them on worldwide
profits so they cannot avoid tax by shifting profits offshore.12
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Importantly, none of the Big Techs can easily escape such a progressive US corporate tax
by “inverting” (i.e., expatriating to another, more friendly jurisdiction) because under
existing law inversions are subject to an exit tax that would be prohibitively expensive
for the controlling founders. As long as Messrs. Zuckerberg, Bezos, Brin and Page control
the Big Techs, and as long as they do not want to pay 23.8% of their unrealized gains
(i.e., tens of billions in tax each) to the IRS, the Big Techs are trapped. And if they were
willing to pay the 23.8%, IRC section 7874 should be revised to treat an inverted
corporation as a US corporation if it is managed and controlled from the US or if it
merges with a smaller foreign corporation, as the Obama administration had proposed.
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It can be also be claimed, that higher corporate tax rates solve the problem of the
transfer of entire consumer surplus (or large portions of it) to the monopolistic platform
itself. When tax rates are higher, larger portion of the surplus is transferred to the state
and not entirely to the platform. In such case, the state can spend more on
infrastructure, which in turn, benefits the public. Hence, in such case, the monopolistic
11
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Apple’s profit for 2019 was $59.5 billion, Amazon’s $10.1 billion, Alphabet $30.7 billion,
Microsoft $16.6 billion, Facebook $22.1 billion.
Infographic: How the Tech Giants Make Their Billions (2019). The other corporations that had
profits over $10 billion in 2019 include other Big Tech (Intel, Micron), Big Banks (Chase, Bank of
America, Wells Fargo, Citi, Goldman Sachs, Visa), Big Pharma (Pfizer), Big Oil (Exxon, Chevron),
Big Telecomm (AT&T, Verizon, Broadcom), United Health, Boeing, and some major consumer
brands (Johnson & Johnson, Home Depot, Disney, Pepsi). All of those enjoy some degree of
quasi-monopolistic status. See
https://fortune.com/fortune500/2019/search/?profits=desc.

12
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On why we should not allow expensing for either physical or human capital see Calvin Johnson, The Effective Tax
Ratio and the Undertaxation of Intangibles, 121 TAX NOTES 1289 (December 15, 2008)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1315477. On eliminating the exemption or lower rate for
foreign profits see Avi-Yonah, “Hanging Together: A Multilateral Approach to Taxing Multinationals,” in Thomas
Pogge and Krishen Mehta (eds.), Global Tax Fairness, 113 (2016). Note also that 70% of US equities are held by tax
exempt institutions or individuals (e.g., through retirement accounts), so that dividends are not taxed and
increasing the corporate tax rate is the only way to effectively tax capital income (unless we abolish all these tax
preferences). Leonard E. Burman, Kimberly A. Clausing, and Lydia Austin, IS U.S. CORPORATE INCOME DOUBLETAXED?, National Tax Journal, September 2017, 70 (3), 675–706.
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platform is not the only party that benefits from the profits of the transaction, but
rather the public at large.
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Last but not least, higher tax rate can also deter large platforms from accumulating vast
amounts of consumer personal data and exploiting it for their own profits.13 Especially, a
higher corporate tax rate on the resale of data, can render it less profitable and
lucrative. In such way, the tax can potentially minimize unwanted consumer data
accumulation by large firms and can reduce the probability of privacy loss.
Hence, Corporate tax can also reduce monopolistic behavior that exploits consumers
directly.
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The corporate tax was enacted in 1909 to regulate the trusts. Changes in the 1920s took
away some of its original power. It may be too late to reverse these changes, but if we
make the corporate tax sharply progressive, it can be used to regulate the Big Techs and
punish anti-competitive behavior. In this way, we can recapture the original intent of
the corporate tax.
4. Conclusion
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The US government, like other governments around the world, is currently spending
trillions of dollars to contain the immediate effects of the pandemic. In the longer term,
much more spending will be needed to strengthen the US social safety net, which was
revealed as uniquely porous among OECD countries and has led to many unnecessary
deaths. Politicians are discussing universal health insurance as well as free public college
education and a massive investment in infrastructure.
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Al of this will require a lot of money. Some more revenue can be extracted from current
taxes like the individual and corporate income taxes, as well as the payroll tax (there is
no good reason to cap the payroll tax at the first $100,000 of income). But there are
limits. We can have a very high corporate tax rate because that falls on rents, but the
corporate tax is only 10% of total revenues, and the individual tax and the payroll tax
(the remaining 90%) cannot be raised too high because that will discourage work.14

13
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See also, Francis Bloch and Gabrielle Demange, Taxation and privacy protection on Internet platforms, Journal of
Public Economic Theory 20.1 (2018): 52-66.
14
The US used to have very high individual income tax rates (up to 94%) but nobody paid them in practice (the
capital gains rate was always much lower) and expecting such rates to be effective now is a fallacy. In general the
existing US social safety programs are more effective than the tax system in reducing inequality. See Avi-Yonah,
Reuven S., The Parallel March of the Ginis: How Does Taxation Relate to Inequality and What Can Be Done About
it? (February 9, 2014). U of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 385; U of Michigan Law & Econ Research
Paper No. 14-003. Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2392971 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2392971
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Thus, in my opinion there is no escape: The US will have to join the rest of the world and
enact a federal VAT.15

15
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For a recent report endorsing this proposal see William G. Gale, Raising revenue with a progressive-value
added tax (The Brookings Institution, Tuesday, January 28, 2020); for my previous recommendations see AviYonah, Designing a Federal VAT: Summary and Recommendations, 63 Tax L. Rev. 285 (2010).
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